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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Ray is a noncitizen who was admitted to the United States five years 
ago as a lawful permanent resident (LPR).1 Ray was convicted of 
                                                          
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, May 2014. I 
would like to thank my Notes and Comments Editors, Patty Devoy, Kacy Wothe, and Rachel 
Kohler for their guidance and support throughout the research and writing process; the 
Hamline Law Review for providing me with the opportunity to publish this article; Aisha N. 
Servaty for her support through this entire process; and to my family and friends for 
everything. 
1 See infra note 22 (explaining the different treatment of LPRs based on the 
amount of time residing in the United States).  
1
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misdemeanor theft at the age of eighteen when he first arrived to the United 
States, but turned his life around and works at a fast food restaurant in Saint 
Paul, Minnesota. One day, Ray borrowed his friend’s car to drive to work. 
Running late, Ray drove over the speed limit and was pulled over by Officer 
Jones, who asked him to identify himself. Ray nervously blurted out a 
fictitious name while rummaging for the car’s insurance card. Officer Jones 
checked this information and discovered that Ray lied to him. Officer Jones 
confronted Ray, and Ray told the officer his real name and explained that he 
was borrowing a friend’s car, so he did not know whether or not it was 
insured. In his report, Officer Jones wrote that Ray lied about his name 
because he could not provide proof of insurance. The local prosecutor 
charged Ray with driving over the speed limit and two misdemeanors: failing 
to provide proof of insurance and providing a false name to a peace officer.2 
Ray, appearing pro se, pleaded guilty to all charges and was sentenced to six 
months of probation and ordered to pay fines.  
Not long after, Ray received a Notice to Appear in Immigration 
Court.3 Immigration officials alleged that Ray should be deported because 
his conviction for providing a false name to a peace officer constituted a 
“crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT).4 Ray argued that he should not 
                                                          
2 See infra note 60 (providing the relevant text of MINN. STAT. § 609.506 
(2012)). The “providing a false name to a peace officer” statute is divisible into one 
misdemeanor and two gross misdemeanor offenses. See MINN. STAT. § 609.506. Bobadilla 
was convicted of the misdemeanor offense. See infra text accompanying note 60 (describing 
Bobadilla’s conviction). See also MINN. STAT. § 169.791, subd. 2 (2012) (stating that failure 
to provide proof of automobile insurance upon a peace officer’s request is a misdemeanor). 
However, MINN. STAT. § 169.791, subd. 2 would not constitute a CIMT because a conviction 
under this statute does not necessarily involve inherently base, vile, and reprehensible 
conduct. See infra text accompanying note 78 (describing the Eighth Circuit’s definition of 
morally turpitudinous conduct). 
3 The Notice to Appear is a written notice to the alien that includes the following 
information: 
the nature of the proceedings; the legal authority under which the 
proceedings are conducted; the acts or conduct alleged to be in violation 
of the law; the charge(s) against the alien and the statutory provision(s) 
alleged to have been violated; the opportunity to be represented by 
counsel at no expense to the government; the consequences of failing to 
appear at scheduled hearings; [and] the requirement that the alien 
immediately provide the Attorney General with a written record of an 
address and telephone number. 
Dep’t of Justice, Immigration Court Practice Manual 4.2 (2008) (describing a notice to 
appear). 
4 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 846 (8th ed. 2005) (defining moral turpitude as 
“[c]onduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality”); see also 9 Foreign Affairs 
Manual (FAM) 40.21(a) N2.2 (2012) (noting that CIMTs most often involve elements of 
fraud, larceny, and intent to harm persons or things); see also Ann Benson & Jonathan Moore, 
Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude: What Advocates Need To Know To Represent Self-
Petitioners & U Visa Applicants, WASHINGTON DEFENDER ASSOCIATION’S IMMIGRATION 
PROJECT (December 2009), https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source 
=web&cd=2&ved=0CDcQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.asistahelp.org%2Fdocuments%
2Ffilelibrary%2Fdocuments%2FASISTA_crimes_webinar_december_09_A8F0BB24E501F.
2
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be deported because providing a false name to a peace officer was not a 
CIMT.5 Who is correct? 
 According to the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Bobadilla v. 
Holder, it depends.6 In Bobadilla, the Eighth Circuit adopted the Silva-
Trevino framework, a three-step process for analyzing whether a criminal 
conviction constitutes a CIMT. 7 The Eighth Circuit held that, although 
providing a false name to a peace officer was not categorically a CIMT, it 
may still be considered a CIMT under the framework’s third step.8 The 
Eighth Circuit’s sudden adoption of the Silva-Trevino framework surprised 
many observers, especially after the court appeared to reject the framework 
in a similar 2010 decision.9 
 This article explores the impact of the Bobadilla decision for 
practicing criminal and immigration attorneys. The Bobadilla court’s 
approval of the Silva-Trevino framework has serious implications on the 
determination of CIMTs in the Eighth Circuit. The most important change 
requires adjudicators to look beyond the record of conviction when the 
record of conviction is inconclusive.10 This additional step necessitates that 
                                                                                                                                         
ppt&ei=f7pQUeG5N6qqyAHop4DoBg&usg=AFQjCNFjAf3PZ4pE6CTFCse3pR9xWyLsIw
&bvm=bv.44158598,d.aWc [hereinafter Benson & Moore, Crimes Involving Moral 
Turpitude] (discussing and providing examples of traditional CIMTs, including: (1) offenses 
with elements involving theft with intent to permanently deprive, fraud and deceit; (2) 
offenses of morally offensive character committed with willful/evil intent; (3) crimes that 
have as an element intent to cause or threaten to cause significant bodily harm (usually 
requiring willful or intentional conduct, but also recklessness in some cases ); or (4) drug 
trafficking offenses). 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 60–65 (providing the facts and background 
of Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2012)). 
6 See infra Part III (providing the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning and holding in 
Bobadilla). 
7 See infra Part II.B (describing the Silva-Trevino framework and its alteration of 
the traditional CIMT analysis in several important ways). The categorical approach has two 
steps. The traditional categorical approach employs one of three tests to determine whether the 
elements of the criminal statute inherently constitute a CIMT. See infra Part II.A.1 (describing 
the traditional categorical approach). If it is unclear whether the elements of the statute 
constitute a CIMT, then the adjudicator applies the modified categorical approach. The 
modified categorical approach allows, at minimum, for the adjudicator to look to the record of 
conviction to determine which subdivision of the statute the alien was convicted under. A 
broader modified categorical approach permits the adjudicator to look at all documents in the 
record of conviction to complete the CIMT analysis. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the 
modified categorical approach). 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 52–54 (describing the Silva-Trevino 
framework). 
9 See infra text accompanying note 70 (noting the Eighth Circuit’s reversal of its 
prior decision in Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 2445 (2011)). 
10 See infra Part IV.A (explaining what “looking beyond the record of 
conviction” might entail for immigration attorneys and adjudicators). Extra-record documents 
may include police reports, prosecutorial remarks, and probation or pre-sentence reports. See 
infra note 54 (providing other potential examples of extra-record documents an adjudicator 
may be able to consider under step three of the Silva-Trevino framework). 
3
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immigration attorneys be aware of all pertinent documents related to their 
client’s conviction.11 Finally, these changes highlight the need for criminal 
defense attorneys to be aware of the possible consequences LPR clients may 
face when they plead guilty to certain crimes.12 Accordingly, an 
understanding of how adjudicators analyze CIMTs is necessary in order to 
provide context for the Bobadilla decision.13 
 
II.  BACKGROUND OF CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL 
TURPITUDE 
 
The United States Congress established the legal term “crimes 
involving moral turpitude” in immigration law over one hundred years ago.14 
Congress did so to prevent immigrants convicted of CIMTs from entering the 
United States.15 Recently, federal courts have held that if an alien is 
convicted of a crime constituting a CIMT, the alien can either be removed 
from, or simply denied legal access to, the United States.16 However, 
Congress failed to define what constitutes a CIMT, and the United States 
Supreme Court has characterized the term as “indefinable.”17 According to 
                                                          
11 See infra Part IV.A (exploring the effect Bobadilla’s application of the Silva-
Trevino framework has on CIMT cases in the Eighth Circuit). 
12 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the need for defense attorneys counseling LPRs 
to be aware of potential immigration consequences). 
13 See infra Part II.A (explaining the history of CIMTs and noting that courts 
have used various forms of the categorical approach to determine whether a criminal 
conviction constitutes a CIMT). 
14 See Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 
1227 (2012) (excluding “. . . persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous 
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude . . .”). 
15 See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 689 n.1 (A.G. 2008) 
(demonstrating that the Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551 was the seminal statute that created 
CIMTs). The act did not cover persons convicted of political offenses, “notwithstanding said 
political offense may be designated as a ‘felony, crime, infamous crime, or misdemeanor, 
involving moral turpitude’ by the law of the land whence he came or by the court convicting.” 
Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551. For a discussion regarding the history of exclusion and 
deportation for crimes, see DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY (2007). It appears the term “CIMT” was a response to joint hearings in 
Congress, which recommended implementing immigration laws to “separate the desirable 
from the undesirable immigrants, and to permit only those to land on our shores who have 
certain physical and moral qualities.” Id. at 115 (quoting Special Comm. on Immigration and 
Naturalization, 51st Cong., 2d Sess., Rep. (ii) (1891) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
16 See infra Part II.A (discussing the relevant parts of the INA); see also 
Immigration Consequences of Convictions Summary Checklist, NYSDA IMMIGRANT DEFENSE 
PROJECT (Dec. 2006), http://nm.fd.org/index_files/ImmigrationConsequencesChecklist.pdf 
(providing a brief outline of immigration consequences for CIMTs and various other criminal 
convictions, including involuntary and/or permanent removal and a twenty-year prison 
sentence for attempting to return after removal). 
17 See infra Part II.A (explaining the INA’s failure to define the term “crime 
involving moral turpitude”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234–35 (1951) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (“[N]o one can really say what is meant by say a crime involving moral 
turpitude.”). 
4
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the United States Attorney General, this failure has caused lower courts to 
apply the term inconsistently.18 To remedy this inconsistency, the Attorney 
General called for a unified, three-step inquiry to determine whether a crime 
constitutes a CIMT.19 This framework was developed in the 2008 Silva-
Trevino case, and it has been a source of controversy among the federal 
circuits. Several have explicitly rejected the framework while the Seventh 
and Eighth Circuit have adopted it.20  
 
                                                          
18 See, e.g., Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688 (stating that the federal courts 
have disagreed in how to approach CIMTs); Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1055 (noting that the 
federal circuit courts’ application of the categorical approach to CIMTs has been “far from 
uniform”); see infra Part II.A (examining the various approaches the federal courts have taken 
to define CIMTs). 
19 See infra Part II.B (describing the three-step Silva-Trevino framework altering 
the traditional and modified categorical approaches and allowing adjudicators to look beyond 
the record of conviction if the traditional and modified categorical approaches failed to resolve 
the CIMT inquiry). 
20 See infra Part II.B (describing the Silva-Trevino framework); see also Mata-
Guerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 260–61 (7th Cir. 2010) (analyzing and adopting the Silva-
Trevino framework); but see Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 473–74 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting the Silva-Trevino framework as an impermissible reading of the INA statute). The 
Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have argued that the Attorney General’s new 
methodology is an impermissible reading of the INA statute, and thus have split from the 
Seventh and Eighth Circuits. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d 462, 473 (3d Cir. 2009); accord 
Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 483–84 (4th Cir. 2012); Fajardo v. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 
1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011). For example, in Jean-Louis, the Third Circuit refused to defer to 
the Attorney General’s new methodology, stating that the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) and numerous other courts have repeatedly held that the term “convicted” prevents the 
immigration courts from inquiring into an alien’s specific conduct or examining extra-record 
evidence. Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 473. These circuits refuse to bind themselves to the 
Attorney General’s view because, in their view, the INA statute is clear. Id. (stating that “the 
ambiguity that the Attorney General perceives in the INA is an ambiguity of his own making, 
not grounded in the text of the statute, and certainly not grounded in the BIA’s own rulings or 
the jurisprudence of courts of appeals going back for over a century.”). Thus, because 
Congress’s intent was clear, Chevron fails, and these courts are not required to follow Silva-
Trevino. Id.; see infra note 68 (discussing the Chevron deference test). The Third, Fourth, and 
Eleventh Circuits held that an individualized inquiry into an alien’s specific conduct and 
consideration of “extra-record” evidence is not permitted. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 473–
74; accord Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 483–84; Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1310. Other circuits have 
acknowledged parts of Silva-Trevino, but have not adopted the methodology. See, e.g., 
Mustafaj v. Att’y Gen., 369 Fed. Appx. 163, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2010) (deferring to Silva-
Trevino’s definition of CIMT, but applying the traditional categorical and modified 
categorical approaches); Kellerman v. Att’y Gen., 592 F.3d 700, 704–05 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(citing both Silva-Trevino and Jean-Louis before applying the modified categorical approach); 
Marmolejo-Campos v. Att’y Gen., 558 F.3d 903, 907 n.6 (9th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that 
Silva-Trevino permits looking beyond the record of conviction “when applying the modified 
categorical approach,” but nevertheless confining its inquiry to the record of conviction). 
5
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A. The Federal Courts Use Various Forms of the Categorical Approach to 
Decipher CIMTs 
 
 Adjudicators have struggled with deciphering CIMTs since the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) was enacted.21 This statute states that 
any alien is deportable if convicted of a CIMT committed within five years 
(or ten years in the case of an LPR) after the date of admission to the United 
States for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.22 Without 
a firm definition, adjudicators in the Department of Justice (DOJ) and federal 
appellate courts have long used varying forms of the categorical approach to 
determine whether a crime constitutes a CIMT.23 The categorical approach 
analyzes the substantive elements of the criminal conviction, as opposed to 
looking at the individual defendant’s acts underlying the conviction, in order 
to determine whether a particular conviction constitutes a CIMT.24 The 
                                                          
21 See supra text accompanying note 15 (describing the history of CIMTs). 
22 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i-ii). Section 1227, in relevant 
part, provides the following: 
(i) Any alien who— 
(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed 
within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided 
lawful permanent resident status . . .) after the date of admission, 
and 
(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or 
longer may be imposed, is deportable. 
(ii) Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of 2 or more 
crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of 
criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and 
regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i-ii).  
Section 1182 provides, in relevant part, that “any alien convicted of, or who admits 
having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of 
(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or 
conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.” § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). “‘Removable’ 
means, in the case of an alien not admitted to the United States, that the alien is inadmissible 
under [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)], or, in the case of an alien admitted to the United States, that the 
alien is deportable under [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)].” AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, 
IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 7:5 (4th ed. 2011). An alien 
who has been in the United States for less than five years and has not petitioned for LPR 
status is considered a “non-immigrant” or “parolee.” § 8 U.S.C. 1255. The alien does not 
actually have to be sentenced to one year in order for the crime to be considered a CIMT; 
rather, the statute specifies that the crime must simply be one for which a sentence of one year 
or longer may be imposed. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
23 Franklin v. I.N.S., 72 F.3d 571, 572 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Cabral v. I.N.S., 15 
F.3d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1994)) (stating that whether a crime is one for moral turpitude is a 
question of federal law). Immigration judges and the BIA typically apply the law of the circuit 
in which it sits; therefore, immigration courts vary in CIMT analysis as much as the circuit 
courts. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688. See also infra text accompanying notes 26–
40 (describing the various approaches circuit courts have used in determining CIMTs). 
24 United States ex rel. Mylius, 210 F. 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1914) (describing the 
categorical nature of CIMT inquiry and using a categorical approach in 1914); but see Ali v. 
Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008); Mata-Guerrero, 627 F.3d at 260 (allowing 
6
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categorical approach involves a two-step process: the “traditional categorical 
approach” and the “modified categorical approach.”25  
 
1. Step One: The Traditional Categorical Approach 
 
The traditional categorical approach considers the elements of 
conviction and whether the offenses defined under a criminal statute 
“necessarily” involve moral turpitude.26 Three different tests applying the 
traditional categorical approach arose out of the circuit courts: the “minimum 
conduct” test, the “realistic probability” test, and the “common case” test.27  
These tests analyze criminal statutes of convictions differently. The 
minimum conduct test states that a conviction will be a CIMT only if moral 
turpitude is part of even the most minimal conduct that could hypothetically 
permit a conviction.28 Conversely, the realistic probability test considers 
                                                                                                                                         
adjudicators to look at evidence outside of the record of conviction in order to determine 
whether the alien’s conviction constitutes a CIMT). The substantive elements of the criminal 
statute are the elements that define the crime; the conduct that constitutes the crime, and 
defenses, which specify under what circumstances that conduct is not a crime. 1 WILLIAM R. 
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6 (2d ed. 2013). 
25 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601–02 (1990) (providing an outline 
of the traditional categorical approach). The Taylor outline has been adopted by courts in the 
immigration context, including the analysis of whether a conviction constitutes a CIMT as 
used in the statute. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 478 (noting several cases where the Taylor 
approach was employed to determine the existence of a CIMT). The “modified categorical 
approach” is only used if the traditional categorical approach fails to resolve the ambiguity of 
whether moral turpitude necessarily inheres to the criminal statute. See Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 
1055 (describing the modified categorical approach). A criminal statute could be ambiguous 
if, for example, it is divisible into several subsections and some convictions under the statute 
involve moral turpitude while others do not. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 466 (“where a statute 
of conviction contains disjunctive elements, some of which are sufficient for conviction of the 
. . . offense and others of which are not, we have departed from a strict categorical 
approach.”); Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006) (“If the statute is 
divisible, ‘we look at the alien’s record of conviction to determine whether he has been 
convicted of a subsection that qualifies as a [CIMT].’” (quoting Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 
332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003))). 
26 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601–02 (describing the traditional categorical approach). 
Taylor involved the sentencing enhancement for felonies. However, the Supreme Court 
imported the categorical approach into the immigration context to determine whether a 
conviction was a theft offense and therefore an aggravated felony. Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185–87 (2007). The categorical approach has also been adopted by 
various courts for crimes of violence and CIMTs in the immigration arena. See supra note 25 
and accompanying text (discussing the Taylor outline); see, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Ibarra, 
522 F.3d 343, 348 (4th Cir. 2008) (using the categorical approach to determine if conviction is 
for a crime of violence); Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(using the Taylor framework to determine if conviction involved moral turpitude). 
27 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 696 (analyzing the three traditional 
categorical approach tests and adopting the realistic probability test).  
28 Id. The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have adopted the minimum conduct 
test. See, e.g., Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Under the categorical 
approach, we look only to the minimum criminal conduct necessary to satisfy the essential 
elements of the crime, not the particular circumstances of the defendant's conduct”); 
7
Bremer: Understanding Bobadilla
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2014
434 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:427 
whether moral turpitude would inhere in acts that would realistically be 
prosecuted under the statute in question.29 Alternatively, the common case 
test determines whether moral turpitude is inherent in the “usual” case or in 
the “general nature” of the crime.30 Regardless of the test used, if the 
traditional categorical approach failed to resolve the inquiry, adjudicators 
would move to the modified categorical approach. 
 
2. Step Two: The Modified Categorical Approach 
 
The “modified categorical approach” is used only if the traditional 
categorical approach does not clarify whether the criminal statute at issue 
involves moral turpitude.31 The type of test used under the traditional 
categorical approach step affects the way adjudicators reach the modified 
                                                                                                                                         
Amouzadeh, 467 F.3d at 455 (“Under the categorical approach, we read the statute at its 
minimum, taking into account ‘the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a 
conviction under the statute.’ An offense is a crime involving moral turpitude if the minimum 
reading of the statute necessarily reaches only offenses involving moral turpitude.” (quoting 
Hamdan v. I.N.S., 98 F.3d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1996))); Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 
411 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Under this categorical approach, we read the applicable statute to 
ascertain the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute.”). The 
Eleventh Circuit has conflicting precedent, but appears to have also adopted this approach. See 
Keungne v. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281, 1284 n.3 (11th Cir. 2009) (“In the [first step of the] 
categorical approach, we analyze whether the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a 
conviction under the statute meets the standard of a crime involving moral turpitude”). For an 
example of the application of the minimum conduct test, see Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 
113, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that “[u]nder the categorical approach, a showing that the 
minimum conduct for which [the alien] was convicted was not an aggravated felony suffices” 
to show that he “has not been convicted of an aggravated felony”). 
29 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 696. By 2008, the Ninth Circuit adopted the 
realistic probability test, which asks whether moral turpitude necessarily inheres in all cases 
that have a realistic probability of being prosecuted. See, e.g., Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 
523 F.3d 992, 1004–05 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying the realistic probability test to a CIMT 
analysis of a California criminal statute). The Attorney General stated: 
A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the 
proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which 
the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve 
moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case 
(including the alien's own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude 
that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones 
involving moral turpitude.”  
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 697, 708 (citing Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193). 
30 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 696. Prior to 2008, the First and Eighth 
Circuits adopted the common case test. See, e.g., Marciano v. I.N.S., 450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 
1971) (using the crime’s general nature and its common usage classification in determining 
whether moral turpitude is inherent); Pino v. Nicholls, 215 F.2d 237, 245 (1st Cir. 1954), 
rev’d on other grounds, Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955). 
31 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 690 (discussing the modified categorical 
approach). The modified categorical approach applies when the criminal statute could apply to 
crimes that both do and do not involve moral turpitude. Id. 
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categorical approach step.32 Under this approach, adjudicators consult the 
alien’s record of conviction to determine which portion of the statute his 
conviction fell under in order to establish whether convictions under that 
portion necessarily involve moral turpitude.33 The record of conviction 
generally consists of some or all of the following: (1) the charging document, 
(2) a written plea agreement, (3) a verdict or judgment of conviction, (4) a 
record of the sentence, (5) a plea colloquy transcript, and (6) any factual 
finding by a trial judge or the jury.34 Adjudicators are not permitted to 
                                                          
32 Id. at 694. Some courts, especially those that use the least culpable conduct test 
for the first step, have referred to this second step as “an exception to [the categorical 
approach] . . . if the statute is divisible into discrete subsections of acts that are and those that 
are not CIMTs.” Hamdan, 98 F.3d at 187. See also Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 466 (“where a 
statute of conviction contains disjunctive elements, some of which are sufficient for 
conviction of the . . . offense and others of which are not, we have departed from a strict 
categorical approach.”); Amouzadeh, 467 F.3d at 455 (“If the statute is divisible, ‘we look at 
the alien’s record of conviction to determine whether he has been convicted of a subsection 
that qualifies as a [CIMT].’” (quoting Smalley, 354 F.3d at 336)). The courts that use the 
realistic probability test, on the other hand, tend to treat the modified categorical approach like 
a second step in the CIMT inquiry, and it is used primarily when the traditional categorical 
approach is inconclusive. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N Dec. at 708 (treating the modified 
categorical approach as a second step in the CIMT inquiry). The modified categorical 
approach is used when crimes that both do and do not involve moral turpitude can be 
prosecuted under the criminal statute due to broad language in the statutes. Id. at 694. In 
addition, adjudicators using the realistic probability test will also use the modified categorical 
approach when a statute is divisible. See infra text accompanying notes 33, 63 (defining the 
term “divisible statute”). 
33 See, e.g., Kellermann, 592 F.3d at 703. The court states: 
We must first examine the statute itself to determine whether the 
inherent nature of the crime involves moral turpitude. If the statute defines 
a crime in which moral turpitude necessarily inheres, then the conviction 
is for a CIMT . . . and our analysis ends. However, if the statute contains 
some offenses which involve moral turpitude and others which do not, it is 
. . . a ‘divisible’ statute, and we look to the record of conviction . . . .  
Id. (quoting In re Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 950 (B.I.A. 1999)). A divisible statute is a 
statute that has several sections or uses disjunctive language to define multiple offenses. See 
United States v. Beardsley, 691 F.3d 252, 269–270 (2d Cir. 2012). Each of the sections or the 
language of the statute can be separated and made into stand-alone statutes with its own 
distinct elements. See In re T-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 22, 23 (B.I.A. 1944) (“If one statute defines 
several crimes, some of which involve moral turpitude and some of which do not, and the 
statute is divisible, it is permissible to ascertain by examination of the record of conviction 
whether the particular offense involved moral turpitude.”). A statute need not be formally 
divided into subsections; “rather, the key is whether the provision is disjunctive in a relevant 
sense,” meaning that a statute can be broad enough to involve conduct that both does and does 
not involve moral turpitude. Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 293 n.9 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Garcia involved aggravated felonies. Garcia, 462 F.3d at 289. However, Jean-Louis affirmed 
the Garcia approach as applicable in CIMT inquiries. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 466 
(applying the modified categorical approach from Garcia “when clear sectional divisions do 
not delineate the statutory variations”). 
34 Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (allowing the use of the 
“charging document,” “the terms of a plea agreement,” “transcript of colloquy between judge 
and defendant,” or “some comparable judicial record” regarding “factual basis for the plea” in 
nonjury cases); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (allowing the use of “the indictment or information 
9
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consider any facts underlying the alien’s conviction that are outside the 
record of conviction.35 The adjudicator looks to the record of conviction to 
determine if the elements, as revealed in the record of conviction, fall within 
the CIMT definition.36 However, if the record of conviction remains 
ambiguous, then the categorical inquiry ends because the adjudicator is 
unable to conclude that the alien was convicted of a CIMT.37 Under those 
circumstances, the alien’s conviction would not be considered a CIMT and 
the alien would not be subject to removal.38 
There are two versions of the modified categorical approach. The 
majority of circuits use the record of conviction narrowly to determine under 
what portion of the statute the alien was convicted.39 The minority, used by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the First and Seventh Circuits, 
permits broader use of the record of conviction because the elements of a 
CIMT may not be the same as those for conviction under the criminal 
statute.40 In light of these different interpretations, former Attorney General 
Mukasey developed a new framework for analyzing CIMTs.41 
                                                                                                                                         
and jury instructions”); see also Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The 
record of conviction includes, inter alia, ‘the charging document, a plea agreement, a verdict 
or judgment of conviction, a record of the sentence, or a plea colloquy transcript.’” (quoting 
Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 2003))). 
35 See In re Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. 709, 714 (B.I.A. 1999) (“Where a statute 
under which an alien was convicted is divisible, we look to the record of conviction . . . . This 
approach does not involve an inquiry into facts previously presented and tried. Instead the 
focus is on the elements required to sustain the conviction.”). Sweetser was also an aggravated 
felony case. Id. at 710. However, the statement that the modified categorical approach is 
limited to the record of conviction remains the same for cases involving CIMTs. See Jean-
Louis, 582 F.3d at 472 (“We review[] only the record of the conviction to ascertain the 
particular variation of the statute under which the defendant was convicted.”). 
36 See, e.g., Kellerman, 592 F.3d at 704 (stating that under the modified 
categorical approach, “the court conducts a limited examination of documents in the record to 
determine whether the particular offense for which the alien was convicted constitute a 
CIMT”). See 9 FAM 40.21(a) N2.2 (“A conviction for a statutory offense will involve moral 
turpitude if one or more of the elements of that offense have been determined to involve moral 
turpitude. The most common elements involving moral turpitude are: (1) Fraud; (2) Larceny; 
and (3) Intent to harm persons or things.”). 
37 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. at 688–89; see also Benson & Moore, Crimes 
Involving Moral Turpitude (“Under [the] traditional “modified” categorical analysis, if [the 
record of conviction] does not clearly establish elements of conviction that fall [within the] 
CIMT definition then CIMT grounds [are] not triggered and analysis ends.”). 
38 Benson & Moore, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude (noting that the removal 
analysis ends if the record of conviction does not clearly establish that the elements of 
conviction fall within the CIMT definition). 
39 See, e.g., Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(stating that the record of conviction should be used if the alien “‘pled guilty to elements that 
constitute a [CIMT]’” (quoting Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 
2005))); Vargas v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F.3d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining 
that the Taylor modified categorical approach is an inquiry into whether the jury had to find 
elements of the underlying offense that would constitute CIMT). 
40 See In re Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330 (B.I.A. 1973) (using the record of 
conviction to assess the underlying conduct even though it was not a necessary element in the 
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B. The Attorney General Establishes a New Framework to Analyze CIMTs 
in Silva-Trevino 
 
Former Attorney General Mukasey viewed Silva-Trevino as an 
opportunity to unify the federal circuit courts’ approaches to determining 
CIMTs.42 While the DOJ generally defers to the relevant circuit court when 
deciding which approach to use in a given case, the DOJ is responsible for 
providing a method for interpreting and applying ambiguous immigration 
law provisions.43 The Attorney General sought to resolve a major issue 
concerning what courts should consider if the traditional categorical analysis 
failed to resolve the CIMT inquiry.44 Some courts prohibited immigration 
judges from inquiring into specific facts of cases.45 Others courts looked to 
the record of conviction for the alien’s prior offense—but not beyond that 
record—in all cases where the criminal statute at issue “prohibit[ed] conduct 
                                                                                                                                         
criminal conviction). See Ali, 521 F.3d at 743 (holding that the BIA could use evidence 
outside of the record of conviction to determine a crime’s moral turpitude). 
41 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693–96 (discussing the Attorney General’s 
reasoning for establishing the Silva-Trevino framework for CIMT analysis). 
42 The Attorney General is authorized to review BIA cases in three 
circumstances: (1) when the Attorney General directs the BIA to refer a case to him; (2) when 
the Chairman or a majority of the BIA decides to refer a case; or (3) when the Secretary of 
Homeland Security or designated officials request referral to the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(h)(1) (2013) (discussing referral of cases to Attorney General). The Attorney 
General’s decisions are considered binding authority within the Department of Homeland 
Security. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2013); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012) 
(“[D]etermination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall 
be controlling.”). 
43 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 695. See also INA § 103(a)(1) (stating that a 
“determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be 
controlling”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2013) (“[T]he Board through precedent decisions, shall 
provide clear and uniform guidance to [the Department of Homeland Security], the 
immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of 
the Act.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2013) (“Except as Board decisions may be modified or 
overruled by the Board or the Attorney General, decisions of the Board, and decisions of the 
Attorney General, shall be binding on all officers and employees of the Department of 
Homeland Security or immigration judges in the administration of the immigration laws of the 
United States.”); I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (“[W]e have recognized 
that judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration 
context where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate 
questions of foreign relations.’” (quoting I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988))); Shao v. 
B.I.A., 465 F.3d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that “only a precedential decision by the 
[Board]—or the Supreme Court of the United States—can ensure the uniformity that seems to 
us especially desirable in [asylum] cases such as these”). 
44 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694 (exploring the various ways federal 
courts view the use of the record of conviction in CIMT analyses). 
45 Id. (citing Rodriguez-Castro v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 316, 320–21 (5th Cir. 
2005)) (“In our de novo interpretation and evaluation of a state law, we look to the statutory 
crime definition as interpreted by the state's courts, without regard to the particular 
circumstances surrounding the specific offender's violation”). 
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that may not necessarily involve moral turpitude.”46 Still other courts 
considered the record of conviction only if the statute of conviction was 
divisible into multiple sections.47 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit allowed 
the BIA to consider all relevant evidence bearing on the particular facts of an 
alien’s prior criminal conviction.48 These differences, according to the 
Attorney General, were problematic because of the impact differing laws had 
on individuals’ fundamental right to fairness.49  
The Attorney General rejected both the minimum conduct and 
common case tests.50 Instead, the DOJ adopted the realistic probability test as 
                                                          
46 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694 (citing Nicanor-Romero, 523 F.3d at 
1007) (limiting review to record of conviction). 
47 Id. (citing Amouzadeh, 467 F.3d at 455) (“If the statute is divisible, ‘we look at 
the alien’s record of conviction to determine whether he has been convicted of a subsection 
that qualifies as a [CIMT].’” (quoting Smalley, 354 F.3d at 336)). A divisible statute is a 
statute that has multiple sections or uses disjunctive language to define multiple offenses. The 
sections or language can be separated and each made into stand-alone statutes with their own 
elements. See T-, 2 I. & N. Dec. at 23 (“If one statute defines several crimes, some of which 
involve moral turpitude and some of which do not, and the statute is divisible, it is permissible 
to ascertain by examination of the record of conviction whether the particular offense involved 
moral turpitude.”). 
48 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694 (citing Ali, 521 F.3d at 742–43) 
(permitting consultation of the presentence report, which is not part of the record of 
conviction, to classify the noncitizen’s offense as one that involves moral turpitude). 
49 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694 (citing In re Cerna, 20 I. & N. 399, 408 
(B.I.A. 1991)); see also Rosendo-Ramirez v. I.N.S., 32 F.3d 1085, 1091 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(“National uniformity in the immigration and naturalization laws is paramount: rarely is the 
vision of a unitary nation so pronounced as in the laws that determine who may cross our 
national borders and who may become a citizen.”). The Attorney General noted that aliens 
committing identical offences may be treated differently based on geographical location under 
the existing arrangement. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694–95 (arguing determinations of 
admissibility eligibility and adjustment of status should not be tied to geographical location). 
50 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694–95. The Attorney General compared both 
tests and found that the minimum conduct test was likely to be under-inclusive of CIMTs, 
while the common case test would probably be over-inclusive. Id. The Attorney General noted 
that the minimum conduct test would be under-inclusive of CIMTs because the test would 
require an adjudicator to refrain from applying the INA CIMT provisions to crimes that 
actually do involve moral turpitude if the adjudicator hypothesized a situation in which the 
statute might be applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. Id. at 695 (citing 
Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1028 (Eisele, J., dissenting) (stating, “I cannot believe that Congress 
intended for [persons who have committed CIMTs] to be allowed to remain simply because 
there might have been no moral turpitude in the commission by other individuals (real or 
hypothetical) of crimes described by the wording of the same statute under an identical 
indictment”)). Conversely, the common case test would be over-inclusive of CIMTs because 
that test allows adjudicators to generalize the criminal statute so that if most convictions under 
the statute involved moral turpitude, then the adjudicator would find that an individual alien 
had also likely committed a CIMT regardless of the facts underlying the individual alien’s 
conviction. Id. (citing Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1028 (Eisele, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he 
statute says deportation shall follow when the crime committed involves moral turpitude, not 
when that crime ‘commonly’ or ‘usually’ does”)). This finding could lead to the unfair 
exclusion of aliens whose conviction did not, in fact, constitute a CIMT. Id. 
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part of the Silva-Trevino framework.51 Under the Silva-Trevino framework, 
to determine whether a conviction is for a CIMT, the court should first look 
to the statute of conviction under the categorical inquiry to establish whether 
there is a realistic probability that the state or federal criminal statute under 
which the alien was convicted would be applicable to conduct not involving 
moral turpitude.52 If the traditional categorical approach is not satisfied and 
the adjudicator determines that the statute could apply to conduct not 
involving moral turpitude, then the modified categorical approach requires 
that the immigration judge examine the record of conviction, including 
documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury 
instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript, for evidence that the 
alien was in fact convicted of a CIMT.53 Finally, if the record of conviction is 
inconclusive, the third step of the framework allows an adjudicator to 
consider any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve 
accurately the moral turpitude question.54 The third step has been the subject 
of the majority of the controversy and criticism regarding the decision in 
Silva-Trevino.55 Several circuit courts, including the Eighth Circuit, 
expressly rejected the Silva-Trevino framework.56 
                                                          
51 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 696 (adopting the realistic probability test). The 
Attorney General stated: 
A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an 
“actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant 
criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral 
turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the 
alien's own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all 
convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones 
involving moral turpitude.”  
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 697, 708 (citing Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193). 
52 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 687. Under the categorical approach, the court 
must examine the case law of the statute of conviction and determine if that statute of 
conviction requires reprehensible conduct undertaken with some form of intent. Mata-
Guerrero, 627 F.3d at 260 (citing Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 701–03). The case law for 
the statute of conviction may illustrate that all convictions under the statute categorically 
constitute a CIMT. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 697. The case law for the statute of 
conviction may also illustrate that no convictions under the statute categorically constitute a 
CIMT. Id. The case law for the statute of conviction may also illustrate that the court cannot 
treat all convictions under the statute as categorically similar. Id. 
53 Mata-Guerrero, 627 F.3d at 260 (citing Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 699, 
701–03). Under this approach, the court examines the record of conviction for indications that 
the alien’s conduct constituted a CIMT. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 698. The record of 
conviction may show that the conviction was for conduct that reflected “specific intent, 
deliberateness, willfulness, or recklessness.” Id. at 697. 
54 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 704. See Benson & Moore, Crimes Involving 
Moral Turpitude (providing that prosecutor’s remarks, police reports (unless incorporated into 
plea as factual basis), probation or pre-sentence reports, dismissed charges, and defendant’s 
statements outside judgment and sentence are not considered part of the record of conviction). 
However, these documents may be part of the extra-record evidence that an adjudicator could 
consider under Silva-Trevino’s third step. 
55 See, e.g., Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 474 (stating that “the CIMT determination 
focuses on the crime of which the alien was convicted—not the specific acts that the alien 
13
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III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Bobadilla marks a shift in the Eighth Circuit’s analysis of CIMTs. In 
Bobadilla, the Eighth Circuit applied the Silva-Trevino framework to 
determine whether providing a false name to a peace officer constitutes a 
CIMT.57 By applying the Silva-Trevino framework, the Eighth Circuit 
abandoned its prior case law, taking into consideration evidence beyond an 
alien’s record of conviction to determine whether the alien was convicted of 
a CIMT.58 
 
A. Bobadilla v. Holder: Factual Background 
 
Orlando Manuel Godoy Bobadilla, a native and citizen of Canada, 
had been a lawful permanent resident in the United States since 1998.59 He 
was convicted in Minnesota state court of giving a false name to a peace 
officer and theft.60 The Department of Homeland Security commenced 
                                                                                                                                         
may have committed”); accord Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 483–84 (rejecting the third step of the 
Silva-Trevino framework for allowing an immigration judge to “rely on documents of 
questionable veracity as ‘proof’ of an alien’s conduct,” including police report and warrant 
application, which “often contain little more than unsworn witness statements and initial 
impressions” that do not account for later events, such as witness recantations, amendments, 
or corrections); Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1311 (holding that the BIA and the immigration judge 
erred by considering evidence beyond the record of the alien’s false imprisonment 
conviction).  
56 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the various circuit court 
cases rejecting the Silva-Trevino framework); see also Guardado-Garcia, 615 F.3d at 902 
(rejecting the Silva-Trevino framework as inconsistent with the Eighth Circuit precedent). 
57 See infra text accompanying note 66 (describing the Eighth Circuit’s adoption 
of the Silva-Trevino framework). 
58 See infra text accompanying note 70 (noting the Eighth Circuit’s reversal of its 
2010 decision in Guardado-Garcia). 
59 Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1052–53 (providing the background information leading 
up to the Bobadilla decision). 
60 Id. at 1053. MINN. STAT. § 609.506, subd.1 provides, in relevant part:  
Whoever with intent to obstruct justice gives a fictitious name 
other than a nickname, or gives a false date of birth, or false or 
fraudulently altered identification card to a peace officer . . . when that 
officer makes inquiries incident to a lawful investigatory stop or lawful 
arrest, or inquiries incident to executing any other duty imposed by law, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Although immigration judges have considered providing a false name to peace officer, these 
decisions have never been reviewed by the BIA or a federal court because, in each case, the 
alien failed to raise the argument prior to appealing the immigration judge’s decision or 
conceded that the crime did constitute a CIMT. See Pinos-Gonzales v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 
436, 438 (deferring to the BIA’s rejection of the alien’s claim that his petition should be 
reviewed de novo); Reyes-Morales v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 937, 944 n.3 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating 
that the alien conceded that his conviction under MINN. STAT. § 609.605 was a CIMT). 
Bobadilla’s theft conviction is only noteworthy because the INA requires two or more 
convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude in order to deport a long-term resident alien. 
14
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deportation proceedings, while Bobadilla denied removability.61 The 
immigration judge concluded that both convictions constituted CIMTs and 
ordered Bobadilla’s deportation.62 Bobadilla appealed to the BIA, arguing 
that the immigration judge failed to apply step two of the Silva-Trevino 
analysis, the modified categorical approach, because the conviction was 
under a divisible law.63 The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s ruling, 
concluding that because “the statute reflects an intentional attempt to evade 
responsibility, the conduct covered by the statute is inherently base, vile, and 
reprehensible, and thus, morally turpitudinous.”64 The Eighth Circuit granted 
Bobadilla’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision. 
 
B. Procedural Posture and the Reasoning of the Court 
 
The only issue on appeal was whether Bobadilla’s conviction for 
providing a false name to a peace officer was categorically a CIMT.65 In 
                                                                                                                                         
See infra text accompanying note 22 (describing the INA CIMT provisions). Theft has 
consistently been found to constitute a CIMT, and therefore Bobadilla’s best chance at 
avoiding deportation was to argue that his second conviction was not a CIMT. See DAN 
KESSELBRENNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES ch. 6 (2002) (reviewing and 
describing what crimes constitute CIMTs and their potential immigration consequences). 
61 Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1053 (providing the background of Bobadilla). 
Bobadilla denied removability because admitting removability would automatically lead to 
deportation. See Reyes-Morales, 435 F.3d at 944 (noting that failing to contest removability is 
essentially an admission that the conviction constituted a CIMT).  
62 Id. In order for an alien to be deported for a CIMT, he or she must first go 
through a removal proceeding to determine whether the crime involves moral turpitude. See 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., EOIR AT A GLANCE 1–2 (2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/EOIRataGlance09092010.htm (describing 
removal proceedings in the DOJ). This determination is made by an immigration judge in 
administrative courts through the DOJ under the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR). Id. at 1, 3 (providing organizational information about the EOIR). An immigration 
judge’s decision can be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2013) (describing the 
appellate jurisdiction of the BIA). The Attorney General may then review cases before the 
BIA under limited circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2013) (describing referral of cases 
to Attorney General). Federal courts may also review BIA decisions in limited circumstances. 
See INA § 242(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2012) (describing the scope and standard for 
review by federal circuit courts). 
63 Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1053. MINN. STAT. § 609.506 has three subdivisions; 
subdivisions two and three constitute gross misdemeanors and would be considered CIMTs 
because these subdivisions specify fraudulent conduct. MINN. STAT. § 609.506. 
64 Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1053. While it acknowledged the Silva-Trevino 
decision, the BIA did not apply the third step of the Silva-Trevino framework as it concluded 
that the statute covered conduct that was inherently morally turpitudinous. Id. (describing the 
BIA’s holding in Bobadilla). 
65 Id. See supra text accompanying note 60 (explaining that Bobadilla’s best 
chance at fighting deportation was to argue that his conviction for providing a false name to a 
peace officer did not constitute a CIMT). Although immigration judges have considered 
providing a false name to peace officers in at least one prior case, this decision was never 
reviewed by the BIA or a federal court because the alien failed to raise the argument prior to 
appealing the immigration judge’s decision. See Pinos-Gonzales, 519 F.3d at 438 (deferring to 
the BIA’s rejection of the alien’s claim that his petition should be reviewed de novo). 
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remanding the decision, the Eighth Circuit adopted the framework laid out 
by the United States Attorney General in Silva-Trevino and held that 
Bobadilla’s Minnesota conviction for giving a false name to a peace officer 
is not categorically a CIMT.66 
The INA expressly gives the Attorney General the authority to 
decide questions of law that arise under the INA.67 The United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc. is the seminal case addressing the issue of when federal courts must 
defer to administrative agencies.68 The deference principles established in 
Chevron were used to determine whether Silva-Trevino should be adopted 
based on the INA’s expressed grant of power to the Attorney General.69 In 
doing so, the Eighth Circuit overruled Guardado-Garcia by accepting the 
Silva-Trevino framework as a reasonable interpretation of the INA.70 
The Eighth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in applying the Silva-
Trevino framework to CIMTs.71 Acknowledging the circuit split involving 
                                                          
66 Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1053 (adopting the Silva-Trevino framework). The 
dissent, written by Judge Gruender, disagreed with the majority’s adoption of the Silva-
Trevino framework in this case. Id. at 1059. In his view, the majority mistakenly focused on 
Bobadilla’s conduct rather than the nature of the act itself, and thus it was reasonable for the 
BIA to maintain, regardless of the Silva-Trevino decision, that “the act of providing false 
information to law enforcement with the intent to obstruct justice is categorically an act of 
moral turpitude” without having to “look behind Bobadilla’s conviction.” Id. at 1061. He 
stated that the BIA’s error was therefore harmless to Bobadilla, and so the majority erred in 
addressing the issue of whether the Silva-Trevino framework is a reasonable way of 
determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude because it was not essential to the 
Court’s decision. Id. at 1061–62. 
67 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (describing the Attorney General’s authority to review 
questions of law).  
68 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984) (providing the test for when federal courts ought to defer to administrative agencies 
decisions). The first prong of the Chevron deference test asks whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If Congress’s intent is clear, 
then the court and the administrative agency must give deference to it. Id. at 842–43. The 
second prong states that even if Congress has yet to speak to the precise question at issue, the 
court cannot simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence of an administrative interpretation. Id. at 843. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843. The court in Bobadilla 
also noted that that “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that agencies may validly amend 
regulations to respond to adverse judicial decisions, or for other reasons, so long as the 
amended regulation is a permissible interpretation of the statute.” Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1054. 
69 Id. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 (applying Chevron deference 
principles to determine whether the agency’s interpretation of a statute was reasonable). 
70 Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1057 (rejecting Guardado-Garcia as dicta and holding 
that it was wrong based on Chevron deference principles). The Guardado-Garcia decision 
rejected the Silva-Trevino framework because it was not consistent with Eighth Circuit 
precedent, which did not allow adjudicators to look beyond the record of conviction. 
Guardado-Garcia, 615 F.3d at 902. 
71 Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1057 (adopting the Silva-Trevino framework). The 
Seventh Circuit deferred to the Silva-Trevino framework because the framework adopts the 
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the framework’s adoption, the Eighth Circuit stated that while other circuit 
courts refused to apply the Silva-Trevino framework, none of these courts 
had carefully analyzed the Attorney General’s reasoning in Silva-Trevino.72 
The Eighth Circuit alleged that these courts failed to conclude that the 
Attorney General’s new methodology was an unreasonable interpretation of 
the INA statute.73 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Silva-Trevino 
methodology was a reasonable interpretation of the statute, and therefore 
must be given deference by a reviewing court.74 
The court then proceeded to apply the Silva-Trevino framework to 
Bobadilla. In addressing the issue of intent, the Eighth Circuit found that the 
BIA had failed to conduct an analysis under the realistic probability test 
required by the Silva-Trevino framework.75 Determining that the statute’s 
requirement of proof of “intent to obstruct justice” was broad and undefined, 
the court reasoned that, under these circumstances, the record reflected a 
realistic probability that Minnesota would apply the subdivision to conduct 
not involving moral turpitude.76 The Eighth Circuit then proceeded to apply 
the modified categorical approach to assess Bobadilla’s crime in light of its 
conclusion that the Minnesota statute was divisible—embracing some 
offenses involving moral turpitude and others not involving moral 
turpitude.77 It observed that the “Register of Action” revealed that Bobadilla 
                                                                                                                                         
Seventh Circuit’s approach to determining CIMTs in Ali. See Ali, 521 F.3d at 743; Mata-
Guerrero, 627 F.3d at 260 (acknowledging and adopting Silva-Trevino). 
72 See, e.g., Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 473–74; Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 483–84 (4th 
Cir. 2012); Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1310 (rejecting the Silva-Trevino framework).  
73 Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1057 (noting that the other circuits had failed to go 
beyond the first step of the Chevron deference test, and therefore never examined whether the 
Attorney General’s interpretation was reasonable). 
74 Id. (analyzing and rejecting the Third Circuit’s rationale for rejecting the Silva-
Trevino framework in Jean-Louis). The Eighth Circuit did not clarify why it viewed the Silva-
Trevino framework as a reasonable interpretation. Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1057 (“We conclude 
that the methodology is a reasonable interpretation of the statute and therefore must be given 
deference by a reviewing court.”). 
75 Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1058 (stating that the BIA purported to apply Silva-
Trevino, but its decision simply reasoned “that because the statute reflects an intentional 
attempt to evade responsibility, the conduct covered by the statute is inherently base, vile, and 
reprehensible” without using the realistic probability test). 
76 Id. MINN. STAT. § 609.506, Subd. 1, requires proof of “intent to obstruct 
justice,” a term the court considered to be broad and undefined. Id. The application notes 
following the obstruction-of-justice enhancement in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
include a wide variety of conduct that reflects a broad range of anti-social intentions can 
legitimately be called “obstruction of justice.” Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. 4, 5 (2010)). The court held that there is a real risk of both over-
inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Bobadilla, 
679 F.3d at 1058. 
77 Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1057. MINN. STAT. § 609.605 has three subdivisions; 
subdivisions 2 and 3 constitute gross misdemeanors and would be considered CIMTs because 
these subdivisions specify fraudulent conduct. MINN. STAT. § 609.605 (2012). Eighth Circuit 
courts appear to be increasingly likely to consider context-based evidence to determine moral 
turpitude. See, e.g., Abdi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 
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had given a false name in the course of a traffic stop and suggested that, in 
this context, many citizens who are not “base, vile or depraved” may be less 
than fully truthful or cooperative.78 The Eighth Circuit remanded the case to 
the BIA to determine whether Bobadilla’s conviction constituted a CIMT 
based on the facts underlying his conviction.79  
 
IV.  APPLICATION: PUTTING BOBADILLA INTO PRACTICE 
 
 The Bobadilla decision has important implications for immigration 
attorneys in the Eighth Circuit. First, adjudicators will now be using the 
realistic probability test instead of the common case test when applying the 
traditional categorical approach. Second, adjudicators are now encouraged to 
take a broad view of the record of conviction when applying the modified 
categorical approach. Finally, the most dramatic change allows adjudicators 
to look beyond the record of conviction at any evidence the court deems 
relevant to determine whether the conviction constitutes a CIMT. 
Immigration attorneys must be aware of all of the information related to their 
clients’ convictions. 
 Criminal attorneys should also have a basic understanding of the 
process of determining CIMTs because criminal convictions will very likely 
impact an alien’s immigration status. Providing a false name to a peace 
officer, along with various other crimes under divisible statutes, may be 
CIMTs and will be subject to the Silva-Trevino framework.80 Therefore, 
criminal defense attorneys should try to plead an alien client’s charge down 
                                                                                                                                         
1166 (D. Minn. 2013) (discussing the alien’s various convictions prior to the removal process 
and noting his conduct did not “comport with that of the average citizen” in his community). 
78 Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1058. The Eighth Circuit determined that the BIA erred 
in failing to consider the “Register of Action” in determining whether Bobadilla’s conviction 
qualified as a CIMT. Id. The court cited State v. Costello, which upheld a conviction under the 
statute, even though the defendant admitted that he gave a peace officer a false name when he 
stopped but claimed that he did not intend to obstruct justice because he immediately gave his 
correct name when the officer warned him that giving a false name to a peace officer was a 
chargeable offense. Id. (citing State v. Costello, 620 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) 
(noting that the defendant’s testimony that he gave a false name to a peace officer was 
sufficient to uphold a conviction under the statute), rev’d on other grounds, 646 N.W.2d 204 
(Minn. 2002)). 
79 Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1059. Dissenting Judge Gruender expressed his concern 
that the Court may be inviting the BIA to conduct an inquiry of the specific facts of each 
individual’s conduct at step one of the Silva-Trevino methodology or to require the BIA to 
always address steps two and three after concluding that a conviction categorically constitutes 
a CIMT. Id. at 1061. He noted that the solution to this issue would be for the BIA to use its 
case-by-case adjudicatory process to clarify when a conviction requiring deception with intent 
to obstruct justice constitutes a CIMT until or unless Minnesota clarified that the statute does 
in fact require conduct that categorically involves a CIMT. Id.  
80 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting that CIMTs most often 
involve elements of fraud, larceny, and intent to harm persons or things). 
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to a crime that does not involve moral turpitude (e.g., one in which the mens 
rea is negligence) and under a statute that is non-divisible.81 
 
A. The Eighth Circuit’s Application of Silva-Trevino Changes the CIMT 
Analysis 
 
 In Bobadilla, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case because the 
immigration judge and the BIA failed to apply the Silva-Trevino 
framework.82 Through its application of the Silva-Trevino framework in 
Bobadilla, the Eighth Circuit moved away from the common case test and 
accepted the realistic probability test.83 The Eighth Circuit held that there 
was a realistic probability that the statute would be applied to both morally 
and non-morally turpitudinous conduct because Bobadilla was convicted 
under a statute that did not include an intent element.84 As a result, an 
immigration judge must now take additional steps to determine whether there 
is a realistic probability that courts would apply a particular statute to crimes 
that both do and do not involve moral turpitude.85 Therefore, immigration 
attorneys should be familiar with the realistic probability test in order to best 
serve their clients.  
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit held that the immigration judge and 
the BIA erred when they failed to consider any conviction documents to 
determine whether Bobadilla’s conviction constituted a CIMT.86 As a result, 
it is necessary to consider the context in which the crime occurred in order to 
correctly determine whether Bobadilla’s conviction actually constituted a 
CIMT under Minnesota law.87 The Eighth Circuit endorsed a broader use of 
                                                          
81 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing CIMTs as crimes 
involving willful or intentional conduct and noting that recklessness may suffice in some cases 
to include moral turpitude). 
82 See supra text accompanying note 64 (stating that the BIA depended on prior 
decisions that did not analyze MINN. STAT. § 609.506, subd.1, instead of applying the Silva-
Trevino framework). Judge Gruender argued in his dissent that the BIA rightfully determined 
that providing a false name to a peace officer constitutes a CIMT. See supra note 66 and 
accompanying text (arguing that the court should have deferred to the BIA’s determination of 
Bobadilla’s status).  
83 See supra text accompanying note 29 (explaining the realistic probability test). 
84 See supra text accompanying note 4 (describing what types of crimes generally 
involve “morally turpitudinous” conduct”); see also supra text accompanying note 76 
(discussing the Eighth Circuit’s application of the realistic probability test to Bobadilla’s 
conviction for providing a false name to a peace officer). 
85 See supra text accompanying note 76 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning that the Minnesota statute could apply to non-turpitudinous convictions).  
86 See supra text accompanying notes 62–64 (discussing the holdings of the 
immigration judge and the BIA). 
87 See supra text accompanying note 79 (detailing the Eighth Circuit’s remand to 
the BIA in Bobadilla). 
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the record of conviction, a position rejected by the majority of federal circuit 
courts.88 
  If the broader use of the record of conviction fails to resolve the 
inquiry, step three of the Silva-Trevino framework allows the adjudicator to 
consider any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to 
accurately resolve the moral turpitude question.89 This is the most dramatic 
change facing practitioners because the BIA and federal courts have 
traditionally refused to consider evidence outside of the record of 
conviction.90 The Eighth Circuit rationalized the court’s decision to allow 
this practice by noting that there is an important distinction between the 
individual who mistakenly gives a false name during a traffic stop and the 
individual who fraudulently does so in an attempt to benefit from obstructing 
the legal process.91 This distinction is important because it is part of the very 
reason Congress adopted the CIMT terminology: to exclude or deport those 
who would flagrantly break state and federal law.92 Aliens convicted of theft 
or drug trafficking are two of the most common examples of CIMTs.93 
 The ability to look beyond the record of conviction has major 
consequences for aliens fighting deportation. Prior to Silva-Trevino, if the 
second step (the modified categorical approach) failed to resolve the inquiry, 
the immigration judge was instructed to dismiss the case, essentially ruling 
that the DOJ failed to meet their burden of proving that the conviction 
constituted a CIMT.94 The narrow modified categorical approach rarely 
resolves the conviction analysis because it only allows the adjudicator to 
determine under which subdivision of the divisible statute the alien was 
convicted.95 However, the broader approach advocated by Silva-Trevino 
allows the adjudicator to examine the complete record of conviction, which 
                                                          
88 See supra text accompany notes 39–40 (discussing the majority and minority 
views on applying the modified categorical approach). The majority (narrow) approach simply 
looks to the record of conviction to determine what statutory subsection the conviction was 
for, while the minority (broad) approach allows adjudicators to use other documents in the 
record to assess the conduct underlying the alien’s conviction. Id. 
89 See supra text accompanying note 54 (describing the third step of the Silva-
Trevino framework). 
90 See supra text accompanying note 55 (exploring various circuit court decisions 
rejecting the Silva-Trevino framework and viewing the third step as inconsistent and an 
impermissible reading of the INA section).  
91 See supra text accompanying note 78 (noting that a person in Bobadilla’s 
position of being pulled over by a police officer may not always be completely forthcoming 
with police officers). 
92 See supra text accompanying note 15 (explaining Congress’s rationale for 
establishing the CIMT provision in the INA). 
93 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing the type of crimes that 
typically constitute CIMTs). 
94 See supra text accompanying note 37 (stating that, prior to Silva-Trevino, the 
conviction analysis ended at the end of the modified categorical approach if the record of 
conviction failed to solve the inquiry). 
95 See supra text accompanying note 39 (explaining the narrow modified 
categorical approach applied by the majority of federal circuit courts). 
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may include information that hurts the alien’s case.96 The Silva-Trevino 
framework essentially gives the DOJ another opportunity to prove that the 
conviction was for a CIMT, should the adjudicator choose to look beyond the 
record. This prospect could be especially damaging for aliens who might 
have negative witness statements or police reports regarding the alien’s 
intent at the time of the crime. Immigration attorneys must therefore know 
the circumstances surrounding their client’s conviction for a CIMT, even if 
that evidence is not contained within the record of conviction. In order to 
assist immigration attorneys, however, the criminal defense attorneys 
defending the clients prior to removal proceedings should have an 
understanding of potential immigration consequences their clients face. 
 
B. Defending Aliens in Court: What Criminal Defense Attorneys Need to 
Know 
 
 The Eighth Circuit’s application of the Silva-Trevino framework has 
repercussions for criminal defense attorneys with alien clients. These 
attorneys must understand the immigration consequences these clients face if 
convicted of any crime because criminal convictions are very likely to 
impact an alien’s immigration status.97 A criminal conviction could 
potentially lead to the alien’s removal from the United States. Therefore, it is 
essential for defense attorneys representing legal immigrants to have a basic 
understanding of the process of determining CIMTs.  
Based on the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Bobadilla, criminal defense 
attorneys will need to be especially aware of the consequences a 
misdemeanor conviction for providing a false name to a peace officer will 
have for an alien client.98 An immigration judge is permitted to look beyond 
the record of conviction in order to determine whether the alien client’s 
conviction constitutes a CIMT.99 This is a shift in the Eighth Circuit’s past 
position, which did not allow immigration judges to look beyond the record 
                                                          
96 See supra text accompanying note 40 (noting various courts’ broadened use of 
the record of conviction to determine whether an alien’s conviction constituted a CIMT). For 
instance, the broader approach would allow an adjudicator to use an alien’s confession of 
providing a false name for fraudulent reasons during his plea testimony, while the narrow 
approach limits the adjudicator’s use of the record of conviction to the statute. Therefore, 
under the broader approach, the adjudicator would find that the alien’s conviction constituted 
a CIMT, while the analysis would remain unresolved under the narrow approach because the 
statute does not specify fraudulent conduct. Because the narrow-approach jurisdictions 
continue to reject the Silva-Trevino framework, the conviction analysis would likely end here 
and the alien would not be removed (deported) from the United States. 
97 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing some of the 
consequences facing aliens convicted of CIMTs). 
98 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that the two gross 
misdemeanor subdivisions of MINN. STAT. § 609.605 involve fraudulent conduct and therefore 
constitute CIMTs). 
99 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (exploring the type of documents 
that can be included in a “beyond the record” analysis). 
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of conviction.100 The largely fact-specific analysis that immigration judges 
will undertake to determine whether the alien’s conviction under the statute 
constitutes a CIMT could essentially lead to a sort of “retrial.” This “retrial” 
allows immigration judges to examine any material he or she deems 
necessary to resolve the conviction analysis, including witness statements, 
police reports, and the alien’s own confessions.101 Therefore, the alien will 
not only be subject to criminal punishment for his or her actions, but may 
also be permanently removed from the United States.102 
Bobadilla’s application of the Silva-Trevino framework may also be 
used in the analysis of other divisible crimes. As of this writing, the 
Bobadilla decision has already been cited by a federal district court applying 
the Silva-Trevino framework to a domestic assault conviction.103 Thus, 
Eighth Circuit courts appear to be increasingly likely to consider context-
based evidence to determine moral turpitude.104 Whether Bobadilla’s 
adoption of the Silva-Trevino framework is a legal aberration that will be 
ignored or overruled in the future, or whether it will remain the law of the 
land, remains to be seen. 
 Based on the foregoing, criminal defense attorneys should urge their 
alien clients to plead to an offense that cannot constitute a CIMT under any 
step of the categorical approach.105 Alternatively, criminal defense attorneys 
should seek a reduced plea to any other offense that would not be considered 
reprehensible or even to include reprehensible conduct based on the elements 
of the statutes.106 The offense selected should only have one set of elements 
and should not be divisible.107 Pleading to a non-divisible statute would 
allow immigration attorneys to later argue that there is no ambiguity in the 
                                                          
100 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (providing that Guardado-Garcia 
rejected the Silva-Trevino approach, including the third step, as inconsistent with the Eighth 
Circuit’s precedent). 
101 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the types of extra-record 
evidence circuit courts opposing the Silva-Trevino framework were concerned would be 
considered by immigration judges).  
102 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining several important 
immigration consequences for a CIMT conviction, including permanent removal from the 
United States). 
103 Ghanim v. Napolitano, No. 4:12CV1818SNLJ, 2013 WL 4401837 (E.D. Mo. 
2013) (applying the Silva-Trevino framework to a domestic assault conviction). 
104 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting an Eighth Circuit court’s use 
of an aliens prior convictions to note that his conduct did not “comport with that of the 
average citizen” in his community). 
105 See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text (discussing the types of criminal 
acts normally considered CIMTs). 
106 See supra text accompanying note 75 (discussing the BIA’s rationale that 
Bobadilla’s act of providing a false name to a peace officer “reflect[ed] an intentional attempt 
to evade responsibility, [and therefore] the conduct covered by the statute is inherently base, 
vile, and reprehensible . . . .”). 
107 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (defining when a statute is divisible). 
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statute, barring the alien’s conviction from being labeled a CIMT.108 The 
conviction would not meet the standard of the traditional categorical 
approach because the conviction would specify a lower level of scienter than 
“specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness, or recklessness.”109 Therefore, 
the CIMT analysis would end, the alien would not be deported, and there 
would be no reason to move on to step two of the analysis. 
 
C. In Practice: Ray’s Story 
 
Ray, the LPR from the introduction, faces deportation due to his 
recent conviction for providing a false name to a peace officer.110 Ray’s first 
mistake was failing to retain a criminal defense attorney to help guide him 
through the criminal process. Ray had a conviction for theft, a CIMT, on his 
record from a few years ago.111 Ray’s criminal defense attorney would be 
aware that Ray may face removal if he pleads guilty to providing a false 
name to a peace officer. Ray’s attorney could then work with the prosecutor 
to plead his charges down to misdemeanor charges for failing to provide 
proof of insurance and speeding.112 Therefore, Ray’s immigration status 
would not be affected by the failure to provide proof of insurance charge 
because that misdemeanor is not considered a CIMT. 
 Without the assistance of a criminal attorney, Ray pleaded guilty and 
now faces the removal process. Suppose Ray retained an immigration 
attorney to help him avoid deportation. The immigration attorney read the 
Bobadilla decision, which held that providing a false name to a peace officer 
was not a CIMT under the realistic probability test of the traditional 
categorical approach.113 Therefore, the immigration attorney should argue 
that there is a strong likelihood under the Bobadilla decision and other state 
law cases that the providing a false name to a peace officer statute would be 
considered non-morally turpitudinous conduct. 
                                                          
108 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting that a conviction under a 
statute that is divisible into several subsections may result in only some convictions that 
involve moral turpitude). 
109 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (stating that the record of conviction 
may demonstrate that the conviction was for conduct that reflected “specific intent, 
deliberateness, willfulness, or recklessness”). 
110 See supra Part I (introducing and explaining the hypothetical Ray’s situation). 
111 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (stating that theft is automatically 
considered a CIMT). 
112 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting that failing to provide proof of 
insurance to a peace officer is not considered a CIMT because it does not involve inherently 
base, vile, or turpitudinous conduct).  
113 See supra text accompanying notes 75–76 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s 
rationale for finding that there was a realistic probability that providing a false name to a 
peace officer may not constitute a CIMT). 
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 Ray’s attorney should then proceed to step two, the modified 
categorical approach.114 The modified categorical approach allows the 
immigration judge to look to Ray’s record of conviction to determine 
whether his conviction constituted a CIMT.115 Immigration attorneys are 
likely familiar with the narrow modified categorical approach used by the 
Eighth Circuit prior to Bobadilla. The narrow modified categorical approach 
only allowed adjudicators to look at the record of conviction in order to 
determine under what subdivision of the divisible statute the alien was 
convicted.116 In Ray’s situation, the immigration judge applying the narrow 
modified categorical approach would only have discovered that Ray was 
convicted under the first subdivision of the statute.117 The first subdivision of 
the statute would not be helpful to the immigration judge, who would then 
likely find that the categorical analysis results were inconclusive and end the 
removal process.118 The end of the removal process allows Ray to remain in 
the country. 
 Ray is not as fortunate after Bobadilla’s adoption of the Silva-
Trevino framework. The Silva-Trevino framework adopted an expansive 
view of the record of conviction, enabling adjudicators to examine the 
complete record of conviction to determine whether an alien’s conviction 
constituted a CIMT.119 Therefore, Ray’s immigration judge will be able to 
use the charging document citing Officer Jones’ report to prove that Ray 
committed a CIMT.120 In this case, Ray will likely be deported, unless there 
is other evidence in his record of conviction to refute this statement.121 Thus, 
in Ray’s case, the results from the broad categorical approach would be the 
exact opposite of the narrow categorical approach. This is one of the main 
reasons immigration attorneys need to be familiar with their clients’ 
complete records of conviction. 
                                                          
114 See supra text accompanying notes 31–40 (describing the two primary forms of 
the modified categorical approach). 
115 See supra text accompanying notes 33–38 (exploring the modified categorical 
approach). 
116 See supra text accompanying note 39 (explaining the narrow modified 
categorical approach). 
117 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (setting out the language of MINN. 
STAT. § 609.506). 
118 See supra text accompanying note 38 (noting that, prior to Silva-Trevino, the 
conviction analysis ended if the modified categorical approach failed to establish that the 
criminal conviction constituted a CIMT). 
119 See supra text accompanying note 40 (describing the minority view permitting 
a broader use of the record of conviction to determine whether a crime constitutes a CIMT). 
120 See supra text accompanying note 34 (explaining what documents are 
considered part of the record of conviction under the Silva-Trevino framework). 
121 See supra text accompanying note 34 (explaining evidence could include Ray’s 
written plea agreement, his plea testimony, and/or the criminal judge’s statements when 
accepting Ray’s plea). These documents would need to indicate that Ray’s conduct did not 
involve fraudulent intent (i.e., Ray was not lying in order to avoid a criminal charge for failing 
to have proof of insurance). 
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 Presume that there is evidence in Ray’s record of conviction 
suggesting that he provided a false name out of fear, rather than in order to 
avoid criminal liability for not having insurance. Ray’s immigration attorney 
should then be prepared for step three.122 Under Silva-Trevino, Ray’s 
immigration judge is allowed to consider any evidence outside of the record 
of conviction deemed necessary to resolve the conviction analysis.123 
Evidence outside of the record may include Officer Jones’ police report, 
prosecutor remarks, and any statement Ray made outside of the judgment 
and sentence.124 These documents have the potential to help or hurt Ray’s 
case depending on their contents. 
 Ray’s unfortunate story illustrates the importance for immigration 
attorneys to be aware of all of the documents related to their client’s criminal 
conviction. Documents that would have previously been inadmissible in an 
immigration proceeding can now be used against an alien. Immigration 
attorneys should try to mitigate harmful statements and documents in order 
to prevent their clients’ deportation. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Bobadilla has important implications for attorneys in the Eighth 
Circuit. The court’s adoption of the controversial Silva-Trevino framework 
increases the obstacles aliens face in proving that their convictions are not 
CIMTs. Criminal defense attorneys must be familiar with these changes in 
CIMT analysis in order to help alien clients avoid potential immigration 
consequences. Immigration attorneys need to adjust to arguing the realistic 
probability test under the traditional categorical approach. Immigration 
attorneys must also be aware of the broadened use of the record of conviction 
and the potential use of documents outside of the record, in order to best 
represent clients. 
  
                                                          
122 See supra text accompany note 54 (exploring the third step of the Silva-Trevino 
framework). 
123 See supra text accompanying note 53 (noting the Silva-Trevino framework 
permits a broader use of the record of conviction under the modified categorical approach). 
124 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (providing a full list of extra-record 
evidence an adjudicator may consider to resolve the conviction analysis). 
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